I work on issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic and language. Below is a list of my papers (and papers-to-be).
- in progress
- paper on that-clause reference and substitution failures
- paper on pleonastic propositions
- paper on Moral Particularism and Universalizability
- 'A Note on Surplus Content', forthcoming in Australasian Philosophical Review.
- 'Adequate Counterpart Translations', forthcoming in Mind.
An important motivation for believing in the modal realist's ontology of other concrete possible worlds and their inhabitants is its theoretical utility, centrally the reduction of ordinary modal talk to counterpart theory as showcased by David Lewis's 1968 translation scheme. In a recent paper Harold Noonan, following the lead of John Divers, argues that Lewis's scheme is not strictly adequate by the modal realist's own lights, and that nothing short of jettisoning de dicto contingency will help. In this paper, I argue that this is a serious overreaction. First, I show that Noonan's problem does not touch Lewis's proposal, since his translation scheme is not even concerned with the relevant sentences. Thus, Noonan's problem only points to a limit in scope. I then go on to propose a straightforward extension of the translation scheme that provides translations for the allegedly problematic sentences, but does so endangering neither adequacy nor de dicto contingency.
- 'Without Reason?' (with B. Schnieder), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97, 523–541.
- 'Priority Monism and Part/Whole Dependence', Philosophical Studies 172, 2025–2031. The published version is available at springerlink.com.
- 'Defining Global Supervenience', Erkenntnis 79, 367–80
- 'Supervenience: A Survey', in Hoeltje, M., B. Schnieder & A. Steinberg (eds.): Varieties of Dependence, Munich: Philosophia, 123–66.
- 'Explanation by Induction?' (with M. Hoeltje & B. Schnieder), Synthese 190, 509–24.
- 'Pleonastic Possible Worlds', Philosophical Studies 164, 767–89.
- 'Der Satz vom Grunde' (The Principle of Sufficient Reason), in Nida-Rümelin, J. & E. Özmen (eds.): Welt der Gründe (= Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie 4), Hamburg: Meiner, 84–94.
- 'What Might Be and What Might Have Been' (with B. Schnieder & M. Schulz), in Conrad, S.-J. & S. Imhof (eds.): P. F. Strawson — Ding und Begriff / Object and Concept. Frankfurt: ontos, 135–62.
- 'Review of J.C. Beall (ed.): Revenge of the Liar', Philosophy 84, 454–58.